The downside of low interest rates (updated 1/2/2026)

Columnist Jeff Sommer published a piece called, "Dealing With the Dark Side of Low Interest Rates" in the May 17 edition of the New York Times. Mr. Sommer’s take is refreshing.  Monetary Doves and Pols on both sides of the aisle typically ignore the ill effects of low interest rates on conservative investors and senior citizens who receive abysmally low returns from their fixed income investments and don't have the time horizon for riskier investments.  

Mr. Sommer points out that in an ultra low rate world, retirees and those approaching retirement, are left with three poor choices... 

“Live on less, dip deeply into savings or take on more risk…”. 

A steady trough of cheap money and easy credit induces bad decisions that impact all of us.  As mentioned in this space over five years ago, a perennial ultra-low rate environment coupled with lax credit standards, was one of the factors that enabled the masses to over leverage and buy homes they couldn't afford before the housing bubble burst.  

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We hear much about the economic benefits of low interest rates including increased capital investment and consumer spending; but there's also a down side.  

Asset bubbles and inflationary pressures strike us all when the cost of credit stays too low, too long.  Yet, it's still easy to find pundits and politicians who always advocate for lower interest rates.  Cheap money.  Who's not for that?

As for the once unthinkable prospect of the FOMC taking short terms rates below zero (a scenario also cited in Sommer's column); it was comforting last week to hear Fed Chairman Powell publicly tamp down the likelihood.  

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1/2/2026 -- AI sourced supporting research for this post follows:

1. Chicago Fed: Underpriced Risk and Liquidity

The Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago has detailed how "easy money" environments fundamentally alter lender behavior.

• Underpricing Risk: Research shows that excess liquidity encourages lenders to be overaggressive, often underpricing the risk of loans in hopes that growth will offset future losses.

• Historical Correlation: Analysis of the last 200 years of stock market bubbles indicates that, excluding war years, every major bubble occurred during periods of low inflation and low interest rates.

2. IMF (2025): Stretched Valuations and Stability

The most recent Global Financial Stability Report (October 2025) warns that the legacy of low-rate environments continues to pose risks.

• Valuation Disconnect: The report finds that financial stability risks remain elevated because asset prices are stretched well above their fundamental values.

• Nonbank Vulnerabilities: It highlights that nonbank financial institutions (NBFIs), which grew significantly during the low-rate era, now act as "liquidity providers" in ways that could amplify market shocks if valuations suddenly correct.

3. Richmond Fed: The Housing Bubble Precedent

The Richmond Fed has published extensively on how low rates create "the perfect environment" for speculative bubbles.

• Speculative Shifts: Their research suggests that when returns on safe assets drop, investors speculate on riskier assets like housing to find yield, a primary driver of the early 2000s housing boom.

• Financial Frictions: Another brief explains that bubbles increase the net worth of borrowers artificially, which temporarily eases credit but leads to severe "bubbly" recessions when the prices collapse.

4. European Research: Impact on Savers and Pensions

Studies for the European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) and other EU bodies focus on the demographic toll of "low for long" rates.

• Solvency Pressures: Protracted low rates put immense pressure on the solvency of pension funds and life insurers that provide long-term return guarantees.

• Retirement Adequacy: The OECD notes that these environments force institutions to scale back benefit promises, directly impacting retirement income adequacy for conservative savers.

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Research Summary for Your Blog Post

Research Source	Key Supporting Document	Core Conclusion
Chicago Fed	Asset Price Bubbles Report	Low rates lead to excess liquidity and underpriced risk, fueling bubbles.
IMF (2025)	Global Financial Stability Report	Stretched asset valuations and nonbank financial risks threaten stability.
Richmond Fed	Asset Bubbles & Imbalances	Low rates were a primary factor in the housing bubble of the early 2000s.
ESRB / OECD	Macroprudential Policy Report	Savers and pension beneficiaries bear the brunt of low-for-long environments.

Private mortgage underwriting can benefit America

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“Isn't this what got us in trouble in the first place?” 

That was the first reader comment following a CNN/Money web article concerning a recent shift by government sponsored entities (GSEs) who buy most mortgages from lenders, to accept down payments as low as 3%. The previous minimum was 5%.  

In an era when banks are forced to hold more capital, the GSEs which became insolvent during the financial crisis and received one of the largest bailouts in American history, have cut the minimum down payment for home buyers.

This policy change enacted by the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA) which regulates the GSEs and by extension, influences trillions of dollars in mortgage exposure to American taxpayers, is worrisome.  Defenders of the FHFA actions point out that the change still protects taxpayers by requiring private mortgage insurance (PMI) and it applies only to issuance of fixed rate loans. 

Fixed rate requirement

Fixed rate notes help borrowers to service their debt predictably which in turn helps to manage taxpayer exposure.  Many will recall that waves of defaults occurred in 2007-2008 after in-over-their-heads borrowers experienced mortgage payment increases from adjustable rate loans that reset to higher interest rates.  

Private mortgage insurance requirement

The PMI component offers less comfort to critics.  PMI is by design reactive -- it kicks in after default.  

President Obama recently directed the Federal Housing Authority (FHA) to decrease premiums it collects for FHA mortgage insurance. (The FHA is an agency of the federal government that insures private loans issued for new and existing homes).  

Like the GSEs, the FHA mortgage insurance fund required a taxpayer-funded lifeline in 2013 after unprecedented default volumes.  The stated intention behind all of these moves is to lower the cost of a conventional mortgage for lower income home buyers. According to HUD, these lower mortgage insurance premium rates (alone) will add 250,000 new first-time home buyers. Should we celebrate new first-time buyers, or new qualified first-time buyers?  

The debate
We continue creation of bubbles inflated by some noble intentions and lots of ignoble politics.  I'm dismayed when people still prefer to blame The Great Recession completely on the banks.  Those voices ignore two indispensable enabling factors -- federal government housing policy and monetary policy.  Without state-sponsored encouragement to make loans to anyone with a pulse, there would not have been enough lower credit quality loans to securitize at the volumes we witnessed.

Private sector alternatives

Private sector partnerships can help mitigate publicly-backstopped asset bubbles in the subprime housing markets.  Such programs, which are beginning to take hold in the Twin Cities and elsewhere around the country -- prove that public-private partnerships can work when funded by entities and accredited investors risking their own money.  Such partnerships might help moderate the huge spigot of taxpayer-sponsored mortgage credit and mortgage insurance programs that the Left continues to embrace, without sufficient taxpayer safeguards.

And the debate goes on...

A refreshing perspective from Phil Gramm. It's not just about the banks

On Bloomberg TV last month, former U.S. Senator Phil Gramm discussed the housing meltdown, as well as, his own work to deregulate the banks.  

Phil Gramm, Wikipedia

During the course of the interview, Mr. Gramm highlights "concerted government action and pressure on banks" to make sub prime loans and destructive decisions in Washington "to force feed housing" ownership.

The Bloomberg interviewer insinuates that there were as many predatory lenders as predatory borrowers.  So, exactly, what is a predatory lender?  I believe many borrowers were unaware of the potential risks of their variable rate mortgages.  That's fair.  

However, were millions of people buying more home than they could afford, or sucking more equity out of their homes than they could afford to lose; all largely duped?  I never believed so and still don't believe so.

Gramm asserted that for every subprime borrower who actually got swindled by lenders, there were "one hundred" that exploited the system, i.e., predatory borrowers.  There's the debate, Mate. 

That millions of borrowers bought properties they couldn't afford, recklessly used cash out financing, or shouldn't have been in variable rate notes in the first place, is clear.  We will debate for years which players and policies enabled the whole sorry misuse of credit.  Laying the entire mess at the hands of bankers is conveniently populist, but incorrect. 

If you don't have time for the whole interview, consider moving the needle to the six-minute mark.

A book: All The Devils Are Here

Back in 2007 while waves of defaults occurred after sub-prime loans "reset" (an adjustable rate mortgage payment that increases after the prime interest rate increases) I asked one Loan Officer,  "Why did lenders write variable rate notes when they knew many borrowers had little capacity to make higher payments down the road?"

What I heard in reply was that as risky as these credit bets were, if conventional higher fixed-interest rates were used, the borrower could not have qualified for as much of a loan.   My reaction?  Exactly.

I'm reading a book by Bethany McLean and Joe Nocera - All The Devils Are Here - The Hidden Story Of The Financial Crisis (Portfolio/Penguin).  I'm learning more about the origin of sub-prime lending and the players behind it, but I'm struck by a rhetorical question the authors pose in Chapter Six, concerning the line between predatory lending and what I have called predatory borrowing:

"But in the larger scheme of things, did it really matter who was at fault?"

Yes.  It matters.  Attention to causality (i.e. fault) is important because sweeping policies are being hatched to curb systemic risks for the future.  If they get it wrong, we'll over-regulate mortgage originators -- possibly choking off  liquidity for many qualified, low income borrowers.  My biggest fear is that we'll fail to transfer liability from the American taxpayer to future borrowers-lenders-investors (where it belongs).

Torinus & Geanakoplos

Today, while viewing old e-mail on a frosty Sunday, I came upon a message I sent August 16, 2009 to Milwaukee columnist and entrepreneur, John Torinus.  Mr. Torinus has some terrific ideas about creating fiscal health and opportunity here in the Badger state.  However, I was piqued by something in his column last summer and I wrote to him:

"John,

While I agree with 95% of the column, the notion – apparently advanced by John Geanakoplos -- that the government ought to force “a write-down of principal on sub-prime home loans that are under water” is wrong. 

I recall hearing one of your presentations on healthcare and the insurance plans of yesteryear which offered no incentive to control costs (as opposed to high deductible plans many of us now have). You likened the situation to a 10 cent Martini night that you observed as a young Marine. Such arrangements, you reminded the audience, just might lead one to be “over-served.”

Well that’s precisely, the story of most sub-prime borrowers – they were over-served and just as no one forced you to drain too many martinis, no lender could force someone to buy more home than they could afford.

Of course, the rest of us who behave responsibly with our health and wealth, pay the price for those who don’t, but that’s fodder for another column.

To keep sub-prime borrowers in "their" homes - the ones with jobs anyway who may just need a little time - there are better options like converting them to renter status, interest only payment extensions, etc. But write down the principle? No. Doing so abets irresponsible behavior instead of suppressing it.

Tougher mortgage underwriting standards have already taken hold because far too many people, left to their own devices, will drink from the trough until they burst."

Rick Santelli is right

Rick Santelli, CNBC

This morning I watched CNBC's Rick Santelli talking from the Chicago Board Of Trade.  His so-called, "Santelli Rant" has been watched on YouTube over a million times and his sentiments today, once again, represent the views of many Americans who believe in living within one's means -- it's how we were raised -- but we lack a microphone.

Rick Santelli was in fine form this morning while debating Steve Liesman.  The topic was banking reform and Mr. Santelli made a case for an elegantly simple cure -- raise the banks' capital requirements. 

Another CNBC commentator astutely chimed in that this is the same risk premium banks require when a homeowner has a marginal credit history -- the bank looks for more cash in the deal -- a bigger down payment to compensate for the risk of default.

Why can't we use the same mechanism to minimize chances of another banking meltdown?  Do we need new federal agencies, reams of new regulations, congressional hearings, class warfare speeches and on and on?  I realize that raising the amount of capital that banks must hold affects their profitability, but maybe it's a reasonable way to manage systemic risk.

The individual and our economic crisis

If you had never met Milwaukee County Executive Scott Walker, you'd be hard pressed to spot him in a crowded room.  Mr. Walker is an average-looking man, with plain features and an unassuming demeanor. Even his name is common. He looks like millions of other guys. I made his acquaintance last year after he introduced himself before a debate with his election opponent, Ms. Lena Taylor.


Scott Walker
Wikipedia image

Yes, a common guy he is, but don't be fooled -- Mr. Walker packs a wallop and his piece in this morning's Wall Street Journal, "Why I'm Not Lining Up for Stimulus Handouts" defines his fiscal moorings and shows why he has drawn acclaim among conservatives and scorn from progressives.

Mr. Walker mentioned what other politicians know -- but often fail to highlight -- which is that our current fiscal calamities, were abetted by individuals -- not just banks, not just regulators, not just mortgage brokers, not just government. Those were all culpable parties to be sure, but what Walker reminds us today, is that our current turmoil began,

"...when millions of people were allowed (or encouraged) to spend borrowed money on homes they couldn't afford and were later forced into foreclosure." 

Amen.  I've been dismayed by the lack of discussion about individual responsibility and reckless borrowing.  In due course, we'll see more acrimony coming from the public, or at least the part of it that still believes in living within one's means.

There are two arguments currently offered to defend bailouts for homeowners who bought too much house, or who should have remained renters until their income and assets warranted otherwise, or who foolishly sucked all the equity out of their homes to buy stuff they couldn't afford. Here are those arguments:

Argument #1) "This is no time to teach people a lesson."

Who said anything about teaching? This isn't about vengeance either. Those who advocate for mortgage bailouts are appropriating money from responsible Americans to pay for the mistakes of others. Bailouts simply perpetuate that pattern.

The only way to help a heroin addict is to take away his opiate (in this case easy money), then encourage him or her to live healthfully. I see no reason why the responsible many should pay the freight of the irresponsible few, simply because the irresponsible few no longer meet their obligations. And in the cases I reference, we're discussing a self-induced foreclosure on a house, not a death sentence visited upon the falsely accused.

Many foreclosure so-called "victims" are personally responsible for their circumstances. There was too much predatory borrowing going on that is now being characterized, as predatory lending.  Yes, I know there were exceptions, people who were truly duped, lost their jobs, became seriously ill, or were improperly foreclosed upon -- but do you think that those cases constitute the majority of borrowers who suffered a foreclosure (I ask rhetorically)?  

Argument #2) "If we don't have mortgage bailouts to stem foreclosures, housing prices will continue to fall precipitously, including yours, so you should support this plan."

Markets work if we let them work. If housing prices continue to fall, they'll only be receding to a current level of value. The continuing collapse of our financial system and our way of life, which appears to be careening toward Euro-Socialism, is as disturbing as the trajectory of home values.

However, if we allow the eggs to break and take our necessary economic pain, the values of our homes could appreciate again one day. Things get better after the hangover. The reality that too few wish to acknowledge is this: we can't have a painless hangover.

Although the thrust of Mr. Walker's piece today is not about individual responsibility, it's about government's financial stewardship -- he gets it. We cannot, individually, or as a society, continue to kick the debt can down the road. It's immoral and stupid.

Our current state Governor, unfortunately, wants to leverage our future, reward his supporters like public teachers' unions and expand government programs we don't need and can ill-afford.  It's widely speculated that Mr. Walker will run for Governor in the next election. If he does run, I intend to support him. I hope like-minded voters in this state will do the same, unless a stronger candidate emerges.

Right now, I don't see a stronger one.

What sequence of events caused the mess?

Hedge fund executive Oscar Schafer in a Barron's interview (January 12, 2009, "Hang on Tight!") described our current economic condition thus: "The world is experiencing a giant margin call."

Yes, a giant margin call enabled by easy credit extended to millions of people who couldn't afford as much home as they purchased, or as much cashed out equity to finance a lifestyle they couldn't afford, before defaulting on their mortgages. 

These mortgages would be bundled into what equated to securitized time bombs gobbled up by over-leveraged financial institutions. 

How did it all happen?


Policy makers in Washington wanted to guarantee home ownership for anyone with a pulse. Then the Fed left open the spigot of cheap money by keeping rates too low for too long and America became intoxicated by illusory home price appreciation. Money center moguls and central bankers made enormous bets upon this whole sorry misuse of credit, until the system collapsed.  

Millions of people, who either ought to have remained renters until their income and assets could justify their mortgage, or who should have purchased more modest homes and received loans at fixed rates, were enabled by government-coddled institutions like Fannie and Freddie and populist legislation to "invest in our communities". 

The risks they took (policy makers, investment banks...and millions of  Americans), have poisoned the well that the rest of us must drink from -- perhaps for decades. Now we hear that the other shoe to drop will come from commercial credit busts, or the next highest risk level of mortgages above subprime.  

Grandma warned us when we were children.  If you can't afford it -- don't buy it. If you can't afford to lose it -- don't risk it. In short, live within your means.  Greed is the same thing that destroyed Rome. How will we get treatment and beat our addiction to debt before we all go down in flames?

Financial humor

If so, please check out this month's "back story" from the November issue of Conde Nast Portfolio magazine. The piece I refer to is called the "2005 SUBPRIME-MORTGAGE APPLICATION"

Note the free bank check at the bottom of the page with inscription, 

"DUPLICATE AS NEEDED".

Portfolio is a new and inspired business periodical. I give its creators plaudits not only because I cackled for five minutes after reading the aforementioned spoof on lax mortgage underwriting practices, but also because this magazine contains incisive stories, fine writing and an attractive layout.

It is likely to succeed in an already crowded space.

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HUMBLE UPDATE -- FEBRUARY 1, 2015

Though I never posted anything about this print publication afterward, the magazine announced its closing back on April 27, 2009. 

So much for my prediction. -- JJM

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